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Sharing values to safeguard the future: British Holocaust Memorial Day 
Commemoration as Epideictic rhetoric 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the rhetoric, and mass-mediation, of the national Holocaust Memorial 
Day (HMD) commemoration ceremony, as broadcast on British television. I argue that the 
televised national ceremonies should be approached as an example of multi-genre epideictic 
rhetoric, working up meanings through a hybrid combination of genres (speeches, poems, 
readings), author/animators and modes (speech, music, light, movement and silence). 
Epideictic rhetoric has often been depreciated as simply ceremonial “praise or blame” 
speeches. However, given that the topics of praise/blame assume the existence of social 
norms, epideictic also acts to presuppose and evoke common values in general, and a 
collective recognition of shared social responsibilities in particular. My methodology draws 
on the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, given, first, its central 
prominence on analysing argumentative strategies in discourse and, second, the ways it 
facilitates a reflexive ‘shuttling’ between text-discursive features, intertextual relations, and 
wider contexts of society and history. Here, I examine how a catastrophic past is invoked in 
speech and evoked through image and music, in response to the demands that uncertainty of 
the future “places upon one’s conscience” (Lauer 2015:12). 
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Introduction 
Since 2001, Britain has commemorated the victims of the Holocaust and subsequent 
genocides on 27 January – the day that Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated by the Red Army. 
The decision to initiate a transnational Holocaust Remembrance Day was taken in the 
Stockholm International Forum in 2000, at the end of which representatives from 46 
governments around the world signed a declaration committing to preserve the memory of 
those who have been murdered in the Holocaust (Allwork 2015). On 1 November 2005, the 
UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/7, which resolved “that the United Nations will 
designate 27 January as an annual International Day of Commemoration in memory of the 
victims of the Holocaust”, and requested “a programme of outreach [and] measures to 
mobilize civil society for Holocaust remembrance and education”.1 
The aim of the British Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), stated from the outset, is “to move 
from the past to the present, from the particular to the universal. The stories of individuals 
and families will be used so that the fate of the Jews and other ‘targets’ of Nazi racial-
biological politics can be personalized and the catastrophe perceived as a human event” 
(Cesarani, 2000: 63). The content of the official HMD ceremony was controlled by the 
government until 2005, when responsibility passed to the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust 
(HMDT). As Whyborn (2011) – the-then Chief Executive of the HMDT – put it, HMD 
“provides everyone with the opportunity to remember the victims of the Holocaust, Nazi 
persecution and subsequent genocides and to honour the survivors of those atrocities” (p.57). 
All national Holocaust commemoration is directed towards taking ‘lessons’ from genocide; it 
is aimed, above all, “as an educational event” (Cesarani 2001: 40) and exists primarily for 
didactic purposes. 
British awareness and understanding of the Holocaust – what Pearce (2014) calls Holocaust 
consciousness – has developed hand in hand with its mass mediation, whether through 
 
 
fictional or actuality genres (Kansteiner 2006, 2008; Meyers et al 2014; Shandler 1999). 
British television and radio broadcast a variety of programmes to mark the day, though the 
form and frequency of this mass mediation commemoration has been uneven. The first 
British HMD ceremony, in 2001, was held in Westminster Central Hall and televised live on 
the BBC to around 1.5 million viewers (see Macdonald 2005; Pearce 2013; Sauer 2012). A 
capacity audience of 2,000 were present in the Hall, including leaders of the three main 
political parties, cultural figures, 200 Holocaust survivors and representatives of the wider 
Jewish communities; Prime Minister Tony Blair gave the keynote speech. Since then, the 
national ceremony has been broadcast four further times: in 2002 on Regional Independent 
Television, and on BBC2 in 2005, 2015 and 2016.  
National HMD commemoration in Britain communicates an understanding of the Holocaust 
as a catastrophe and a great affront to Our values; detailing the circumstances and 
consequences of the Holocaust acts to revivify Our commitment to the values that it so 
clearly transgressed. These values are invoked linguistically and evoked through other modes 
– principally images and music. This article analyses the rhetoric, and mass-mediation, of the 
national Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) commemoration ceremony, as broadcast on British 
television, and specifically focuses on the ways that it communicates social values. Given 
that the Holocaust has become a fixture of Western culture (Cole 2000; Marrus 2015), my 
findings have relevance beyond British commemoration of the Holocaust. 
 
 
Literature Review 
Rhetorical arguments, schemes and tropes are utilised in commemoration as part of 
pedagogic – and persuasive – strategies, aimed at achieving communion between various 
institutionalised “memory makers” and “memory consumers” (Kansteiner 2002). Since 
 
 
Aristotle, “Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the 
available means of persuasion” (Rhetoric 1355b 27-28). As such, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
“provides a method for looking at rhetoric as a human phenomenon, for learning how to use 
it, and also for a system of criticism” (Kennedy 2005: 20).  
Aristotle identified three species of rhetorical discourse: deliberative/political rhetoric; 
forensic/legal rhetoric; and epideictic/ceremonial rhetoric. Each of these three species of 
persuasive discourse have specific rhetorical goals and hence tend to adopt special topics in 
articulating (and, ideally, in fulfilling) such goals. Epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric is 
directed towards proving someone or something worthy of admiration or disapproval; it is 
concerned with the present, its means are praise and censure and its special topics are honour 
and dishonour. In more detail, Aristotle’s Rhetoric codified epideictic “primarily as a written 
genre (3.12) delivered before an audience of spectators (1.3), which praises or blames a 
subject (1.3), relates this topic to the present time (1.9), and achieves its rhetorical force 
(dynamis) through ethos (1.9), amplification (3.17), and narrative (3.16)” (Lauer 2015: 5).  
The three species of rhetoric are heuristics, of course, that seldom occur in everyday 
argumentation in a pure form (Richardson 2007; Wodak & De Cillia 2007). Commemoration 
represents a blended rhetorical genre that brings together the epideictic and forensic species 
of rhetorical argument, operates through a combination of praise/censure and 
accusation/defence, and draws on the special topics of (dis)honour and (in)justice. In such 
discourse, the language of values and praise typical of epideictic rhetoric is blended with 
narrative accounts of the past and the language of (self)identification, deictically fixed to the 
here and now (Billig & Marinho 2017; Slavíčková 2013, 2014). They “retrive the past for the 
present” (Wodak & De Cillia 2007: 346), the ideal rhetorical consequence of which is that 
'we' associate ourselves with the praised actors and actions of the past and disassociate 
ourselves from those criticised.  
 
 
Epideictic rhetoric has, in the past, been depreciated as ceremonial “praise or blame” 
speeches which simply trade on commonplace knowledge. As such, epideictic tends to be the 
Aristotelian species of rhetoric that attracts the least critical attention from scholars (though 
see Billig & Marinho 2017). A great deal of this may be attributable to Aristotle’s own failure 
to “formulate its role in the instilling, preservation, or enhancement of cultural values, even 
though this was clearly a major function” (Kennedy 2005: 22). Epideictic does invoke praise 
and blame. However, given that the rhetorical strategies of praise or blame assume the 
existence of social norms, upon which this praise or blame is based, epideictic also acts to 
presuppose and evoke common values – and, implicitly, a collective recognition of shared 
social responsibilities to uphold these values (Kampf & Katriel 2016). On this point, Duffy 
(1983: 85) argues that the purpose of epideictic oratory is to “represent, however imperfectly, 
timeless values distilled from past experiences”. Such values are invoked for educative and 
ethical reasons (Burgess 1902; Kampf & Katriel 2016; Perelman 1982; Pernot, 2015; 
Rosenfield 1980). For Hyde (2005a: 11), epideictic acts as “a collective or public form of 
recognition, a pragmatic and ‘moral act’ that supplies meaning to life; it facilitates social 
awareness and understanding to recognize and understand difference.” Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 50) go as far as to argue that “epideictic oratory has significance and 
importance for argumentation because it strengthens the disposition toward action by 
increasing adherence to the values it lauds.” Similarly, Vatnoey (2015: 1) suggests that 
epideictic “has the potential to strengthen the common values in society, create community, 
and form the beliefs that determine future decision-making.” Thus, whilst epideictic 
“generally features colourful style, praise and blame, non-controversiality, universal values, 
and prominent leaders and speakers. Each of these characteristics arises because it serves 
optimally the function of communal definition” (Condit 1985: 291). 
 
 
Epideictic rhetoric is therefore one way in which what Elder-Vass (2010, 2011, 2012, 2015) 
calls “norm circles” are discursively invoked, shaped and shared. Norm circles are “groups of 
people who are committed to endorsing and enforcing specific norms” (Elder-Vass 2012: 
201-202). More specifically, Elder-Vass (2012: 22-23) argues that norm circles “are social 
entities with people as their parts, and because of the ways in which the members of such 
groups interact (a mechanism) they have the causal power to produce a tendency in 
individuals to follow standardised practices”. Causal powers “operate as tendencies. Any 
given causal power has a tendency to produce a certain sort of outcome but these tendencies 
may be frustrated when causal powers with conflicting tendencies interact with them” (Elder-
Vass 2012: 16). Epideictic rhetoric works against this erosion of values, acting to bolster the 
causal power of the norm circle by revivifying its commitment to a shared norm. The 
epideictic orator is someone who “by speaking wishes to strengthen established values”, 
which “may be likened to the guardian of dykes under constant assault by the ocean” 
(Perelman & Olbrects-Tyteca 1969: 55). As Lauer (2015: 12) puts it, “With an awareness that 
the future is always not yet present, epideictic responds to the demands that such uncertainty 
places upon one’s conscience.” This uncertainty provokes what Hyde (2005b: 7) refers to as 
“the call of conscience,” understood as an appeal founded on “the related issues of right and 
wrong, the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, the truth and the untruth” (see also 
Butler 1995).  
Tileagă (2011: 197) argues that in certain social contexts – e.g. where there are hegemonic 
understandings of victim, perpetrator and bystander roles – “biography, memory, and identity 
are managed and displayed” rather than invoked as part of explicit persuasive strategies. 
However, just because such materials are documented, rather than being utilised explicitly as 
part of an argument, doesn’t mean that they’re not being used rhetorically. Aristotle referred 
to such strategies as non-artistic means of persuasion, since they “do not depend on the 
 
 
speaker’s skill but are based on using pre-existing material” (van Eemeren et al 1996: 43). 
Non-artistic means of persuasion amount to other texts (laws, witnesses, photographs, etc.) 
that the speaker calls upon and uses, so does not need to invent. Examples of this in HMD 
commemoration include iconic photographs, or archival films, which are used as visual 
reminders of the people being commemorated and the historic events in which they were 
involved. Artistic means of persuasion are of three types: “through character [ethos] 
whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for 
we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly (Rhetoric 1356a 4); 
“through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [pathos] by the speech; for we do not 
give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile” 
(Rhetoric 1356a 5); and “through the arguments [logos] when we show the truth or the 
apparent truth from whatever is persuasive” (Rhetoric 1356a 6). The ethetic manoeuvring of 
the speaker, and their ability to display phronēsis (practical wisdom) and arēte (virtue), is 
marked as being particularly important to the success of epideictic rhetoric (see Hauser 
1999). 
Lauer (2015: 8) argues: “Advances in epideictic scholarship require an understanding of the 
pivotal role that the non-linguistic features of certain rhetorical events play in producing 
meaning.” In short, epideictic arguments are frequently advocated multi-modally. Groarke 
(2013: 34) supports his case for “accepting multi-modal arguments” by reasoning that an 
argument, at base, “is an attempt to support a conclusion by presenting evidence for it – 
something that can clearly be done in ways that extend beyond premises and conclusions 
understood as declarative sentences.” This is certainly the case when examining complex, 
multi-modal speech events such as commemorations (Sauer 2012), where music, colour and 
movement can be used to play with the sentiment and mood of the audience, thereby 
contributing to an event’s pathotic rhetorical strategies. 
 
 
 
Data and Method 
This article is drawn from a wider project aimed at analysing linguistic and semiotic 
processes employed in the commemoration of HMD, their potential for shaping the 
understanding of mass audiences and the ways that the commemoration of HMD has changed 
since 2002. I am particularly interested in the rhetorical use of the past in the construction of 
political arguments regarding (collective) identity and (shared) values (Forchtner 2016). 
My methodology draws on Critical Discourse Studies, and more specifically on the 
Discourse-Historical Approach (Heer et al 2008; Krzyżanowski 2010; Reisigl 2018; Reisigl 
& Wodak 2001, 2009; Richardson 2017a; Richardson & Wodak 2009; Slavíčková 2013, 
2014; Wodak & De Cillia 2007; Wodak et al 1999), in order to make sense of (1) the field of 
remembrance and its genres (e.g. ceremonies, speeches, stories, testimony, music, minutes of 
silence, etc.) and (2) the ways that they reflect the complex interplay between collective 
remembering (Wertsch 2002) and social and historic contexts. The Discourse-Historical 
Approach (DHA) specifically orientates to argumentation as a discursive strategy in which 
people may offer, justify, legitimate or criticise standpoints. 
As stated above, there are three types of artistic means of persuasion: through character 
(ethos, utilizing ethetic strategies), through emotion (pathos, utilizing pathotic strategies) and 
through argument (logos, utilizing logetic strategies). Logetic strategies, or argumentation 
schemes (and here I depart with Aristotle and draw on contemporary argumentation theory) 
constructed and/or delivered by the rhetor are of three types: symptomatic argument (arguing 
from example); comparative argument; and causal argument (Snoeck Henkemans 2002; van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). Taking each in turn: symptomatic arguments are based on 
relations of typicality, symptoms or concomitance. Often in such arguments, an example is 
used to illustrate a wider pattern or trend – and such arguments can fail due to hasty 
 
 
generalization. This fallacy is most closely related to non-artistic means of persuasion, when 
‘evidence’ produced is not symptomatic of the standpoint. Comparison argumentation is 
based on a relation of analogy. An arguer defends his/her standpoint by showing that what is 
stated in the argument is similar to that which is stated in the standpoint “and that on the 
grounds of this resemblance the standpoint should be accepted” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst 
& Snoeck Henkemans, 2002: 99). Analogous argumentation fails most frequently due to poor 
grounds for comparison. Finally, with causal argumentation “the acceptability of the premises 
is transferred to the conclusion by making it understood that there is a relation of causality 
between the argument and the standpoint” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 97). Causal 
argumentation can fail for a variety of reasons, including causal oversimplification (also 
called causal reductionism), and classic post hoc ergo propter hoc and slippery slope 
fallacies. 
This article analyses the four national (British) HMD ceremonies broadcast on television 
since 2001. In 2005, 2015 and 2016 the BBC broadcast the full hour-length ceremony; in 
2002, an abbreviated version, edited to 25 minutes, was broadcast on Regional Independent 
TV (though the ceremony itself was a full hour). These ceremonies feature a combination of 
film, music, candle lighting, and speeches from celebrities, survivors and public figures. As 
Macdonald (2005: 62) put it, they are organised not as “a single ritual but a show – a 
sequential set of pieces” which, in keeping with the aim of HMD, are “more explicitly 
pedagogical than many memorials”. Table 1, below, presents the content and running order of 
the 2002 commemoration.  
  
 
 
Table 1: Running order of the 2002 HMD commemoration, as broadcast on ITV 
Time Segment Speaker Gist 
0-1.16 Opening; music 
with Voice 
Over 
Unknown Provides an abstract for the 
programme: introduces the 
Holocaust as a historic event & why 
it is commemorated 
1.17-2.58 Music with 
testimony 
Two female 
Holocaust survivors 
Fragments of personal narratives of 
oppression; music provides 
emotional tenor 
2.59-4.15 Poem, ‘Refugee 
Blues’ by WH 
Auden 
Christopher 
Eccleston 
Reading of a poem 
4.16-7.08 Music with 
testimony 
Two male and then 
one female 
Holocaust survivor 
Fragments of personal narratives of 
oppression and mass murder; music 
provides emotional tenor 
7.09-8.42 Reading, 
wrongly 
captioned ‘Elli’ 
Wiesel 
Ben Kingsley Reading of book extract – incredibly 
portentous delivery  
8.43-11.05 Music - Music, not identified on screen 
11.08-
13.15 
Homily, with 
music 
Chief Rabbi 
Jonathan Sacks 
Speech shown in full; music (not 
identified) fades in half way through 
13.16-
14.53 
Poem, 
‘Colourblind’ 
by Lemn Sissay 
Lemn Sissay Poem about (white) people claiming 
not to see his (black) colour; critique 
of implicit racism in denials of racial 
particularism 
14.54-
16.57 
Music, 
combined with 
testimony 
Three unnamed 
speakers, give very 
brief points about 
persecution and 
discrimination 
Disabled speaker refers to murder 
and forced sterilization of disabled 
people under Nazism; gay speaker 
gives abbreviated narrative of 
prejudice against homosexuals now; 
Roma speaker mentions importance 
of education 
16.57-
19.05 
Speech David Blunkett, 
Home Secretary 
Speech about Holocaust, its 
relevance today (and our requirement 
to welcome the stranger); finishes by 
suggesting survivors make us 
humble 
19.06-
21.30 
Prayer Cantor  Sung in Hebrew, no subtitles 
21.34-
22.07 
Poem, Pastor 
Niemoller 
Four speakers, 
including 
Ecclestone & 
Kingsley 
Abbreviated version of the poem 
(refers to Communists, Trade 
Unionists, Jews, and ‘no one left to 
speak for me’) 
22.08-
24.00 
Song, 
‘Something 
inside so strong’ 
by Labi Siffre 
Manchester 
Community Choir 
Mixed-sex choir, singing acapella  
 
 
 
The hour-long broadcasts in 2005, 2015 and 2016 followed a very similar structure, though 
with additional speakers, more musical items, additional video packages (e.g. following a 
survivor of Belsen returning to the Camp), and an extended sequence of candle lighting as the 
penultimate segment before a final song.  The national HMD ceremony in Britain should 
therefore be approached as an example of multi-genre epideictic rhetoric, working up 
meanings through a hybrid combination of genres (speeches, poems, readings), 
author/animators and modes (speech, music, light, movement and silence).  
Below, I examine the sections of the ceremonies that included non-political actors; in a 
companion article, I analyse the speeches delivered by politicians. My analysis below 
specifically orientates to the distinction between non-artistic and artistic means of persuasion.  
 
Non-artistic epideictic rhetoric  
Each broadcast programme of the HMD ceremony includes examples of texts that could be, 
and have been, used in other contexts. These texts – photographs and archival film – are used 
to demonstrate the facticity of the Holocaust. As Bathrick (2008: 1) put it: media 
visualizations serve “for some as virtual access to knowledge of the horror; in a few cases, 
they even provided preeminent verification that it actually happened […] pictorial icons by 
which many have sought to capture the seemingly unimaginable.” That is, they are used to 
document the past – or, as an introduction during the 2016 ceremony put it, to remind us of 
“the scenes that so shocked the world at the end of the Second World War, and are still 
shocking us all today” (2016: 2.41-2.48).  
  
 
 
Table 2: Historic narrative, 2016 Ceremony broadcast 
[3.02] 
 
[Music plays: duet with 
piano and violin] 
[3.19] 
 
 
[3.43] 
 
[…presenter David 
Olusoga] “a camp that had 
already become a vast, open 
air cemetery.  
[3.48] 
 
[Olusoga, voice over] There 
were thousands upon 
thousands of bodies. Piled 
up, across the camp.” 
 
The images used in montages such as this – included in similar audio-visual packages in the 
2005, 2015 and 2016 ceremonies – are dominated by the now familiar visual black and white 
iconography of the Holocaust: camps; corpses; barbed wire; emaciated bodies; striped 
‘pyjama-style’ suits; and soldiers. Such film and images are occasionally included without 
commentary – they are used in the programme opening credits, or as a projected backdrop to 
 
 
a speaker on stage, or are intercut with footage of survivor testimony as exemplars of the 
barbarity they experienced and are describing. When images are referred to directly, they are 
prefaced by reporting verbs that entail the realist assumptions of the speakers: the film and 
images demonstrate, show, make evident or, in the case of the montage in Table 2, they 
“revealed the full scale of Nazi barbarism”.  
There is, of course, no question that this is what they do: they document inhumanity and they 
retain their ability to shock and disgust. However, we do well to remember that these images 
also have a production history, which is often elided by the way that archival footage from 
different sources is edited together. Thus, the historic narrative from 2016, presented in Table 
2 above, continues as follows: 
Table 3: Historic narrative, 2016 Ceremony broadcast 
[4.10] 
 
[David Olusoga, voice over] 
“Those liberated by the 
Allies across Europe, in 
1945, were survivors 
[4.15] 
 
of the brutal concentration 
and extermination camps, 
established throughout Nazi 
occupied countries. 
[4.31] 
 
Barbarous institutions, where 
millions of people had been 
sent to be worked to death.” 
 
 
 
The three sections of archival film are clearly being used as exemplars of three historic 
‘scenes’ described in voice over: of survivors; of Nazi camps; and being worked to death. 
The provenance of the first image is unclear, though it’s typical of ‘liberator footage’ shot at 
western camps, by British and American cameramen. The second and third scenes, however, 
are clearly different: they show Nazis (including Heinrich Himmler) brutalising victims, and 
therefore must have been filmed by Nazi cameramen. We should therefore consider their 
objective: what these images were originally intended to achieve, and the extent to which the 
ideology of the filmmaker is implicit in the perspectivisation of the image. This is, after all, 
‘perpetrator footage’, and its existence is simultaneously an index, an icon and a symbol of 
power abuse; those being dehumanised in the images are meant to be viewed (by us, even 
now) as less than human. In his examination of perpetrator photographs, Prager (2008: 19) 
asks “whether one needs to theorize new modes of reading in order to examine” images taken 
by those responsible for committing the atrocities depicted. Can, or should, we treat the 
“camera as a metonymic extension of Nazi weaponry” (Prager 2008: 22)? And, when 
viewing these images, even at HMD ceremonies, “To what extent are we making ourselves 
complicit with the values […] of a particular point of view?” (Bathrick 2008: 3). 
That said, ‘liberator’ images may also be used as part of fallacious symptomatic visual 
arguments. Hannah Arendt, for example, examined the way that many of the Allied photos, 
taken immediately after the war, communicated ‘misleading’ impressions of the Holocaust: 
These images mislead us, she contends, because they depict almost exclusively 
concentration camps located more to the west at a specific moment of chaos and 
disintegration in the final days of the war and not how the camps functioned for most 
of the three years before that. By the initial deployment of the photos, the mountains 
of dead and half-dead bodies in Buchenwald, Dachau and Bergen-Belsen were 
 
 
transformed in people’s minds into the reality of the camps in toto, although none of 
them were extermination camps. (Bathrick 2008: 6) 
The issue with liberator images, then, is different from that of perpetrator images. With 
perpetrator images, we cannot assume even a basic “indexical link of the analogue image 
with the pro-filmic world” (Böser 2012: 38), given that subjects were manipulated, scenes 
staged and frequently re-shot to create precise filmic tableaus that reflected Nazi ideological 
preoccupations.2 For liberator images, and indeed all images taken of the camps after 
liberation, the critical issues are less their indexical function, and more the ways that they 
have taken on iconic or symbolic meanings. Without sufficient clarification and 
contextualisation, directing the audience how we are to understand the standpoint of the non-
artistic proof, they could be used (fallaciously) to symptomatically ‘represent Belsen’, or 
even ‘the Holocaust’ as a whole, rather than the particular pro-filmic scene.  
 
Artistic epideictic rhetoric 
Artistic means of persuasion can be split into two groupings, according to their production 
format (Goffman 1981). In any communicative event, Goffman (1981: 144) argues that the 
speaker/writer role can be broken down into three functional roles – the animator, the author 
and the principal. Taking each in turn, Goffman suggests: the author is realised by “someone 
who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are 
encoded”; the animator is the “body engaged in acoustic activity”, or the “individual[s] active 
in the role of utterance production”; whilst the principal is “someone whose position is 
established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone 
who is committed to what the words say” (emphases added, Ibid.). As Table 1 showed, HMD 
commemorative events include Delivered texts, where the animator reads the words of 
 
 
another author; and Embodied texts, where the animator and author are the same person. In 
both cases, the principal is the norm circle as a whole (Richardson 2017b).  
Whilst Delivered texts are a vital part of commemorative events – their use and reuse over 
time contributing to a de facto commemorative liturgy – it is Embodied texts that I analyse 
for the remainder of this article. 
 
Embodied texts 
Two forms of Embodied text play a central role in HMD commemoration: survivor testimony 
and speeches by the Chief Rabbi. Together – the former communicating first-hand historical 
experience and the latter communicating values – they represent the necessary and sufficient 
features of the national Holocaust commemoration.  
The first segment of the 2002 ceremony involves two unnamed Holocaust survivors 
recounting fragments of personal narratives of oppression; their collective narrative is added 
to later in the broadcast, by three further unnamed survivors.3 From 2005, the survivors 
featured in the broadcasts were always named, identified by on-screen captions: Iby Knill and 
Otto Deutsch spoke in 2015, also appearing in a video segment with fellow Holocaust 
survivors Renee Salt and Ivor Perl; Bosnian genocide survivor Kemal Pervanic featured in a 
second video segment; Gena Turgel read from her memoire of the Holocaust, immediately 
before the minutes’ silence and the ceremonial lighting of candles; and the penultimate 
segment of the ceremony involved Otto Deutscher, Renee Salt, Iby Knill and Kemal Pervanic 
recounting “What I hope people will learn”. In the 2016 broadcast, Embodied testimony was 
given by Holocaust survivors Susan Pollock, Joan Salter and Cirla Lewis, whilst testimony 
from a survivor of the ongoing genocide in Darfur was Delivered by the actress Naomie 
Harris. 
 
 
One of the more striking instances of Embodied survivor testimony was included in the 2005 
ceremony, and spoken by Hannah Goslar. Her inclusion seems designed to provide an 
emotional jolt – the segment immediately before was a reading from Anne Frank’s Diary, 
where Anne recounts an upsetting nightmare, in which her friend Hannah died. The camera 
then cuts to another woman on stage, who states: “I was the girl Hannah Goslar. Anne Frank 
dreamed about my death and wrote about it in her diary. But it was she who died while I 
survived”. Opening her speech with the words “I was the girl Hannah Goslar”, as opposed to 
simply “I am Hannah Goslar” is a very interesting choice. In one sense, speaking of Hannah 
Goslar in the past tense is literally true: since emigrating to Israel in 1947, and marrying 
Walter Pick, she now goes by the name of Hanneli Pick-Goslar. However, the choice of 
words also speaks to the profound differences between her life before, during and after the 
war. The war changed her; the Holocaust changed her; she no longer considers herself to be 
the same person.  
Pernot (2015: 83) points out that archetypical “epideictic orators are distinguished persons: 
distinguished as much by their wisdom and honesty as through their culture and social and 
political position.” With Hannah Goslar we have an exemplary example: someone who can 
speak, with authority, on the personal qualities of Anne Frank – described by Cole (2000: 46) 
as “the ideal symbol of the ‘innocent victim’ and the ideal symbol of potential snuffed out” – 
because, as Hannah put it in her speech, “she was my childhood friend”. As she speaks to the 
audience, images of times she shared with Anne when she was young can be seen projected 
on the screen behind her; for the televisual audience, these are shown as full-screen images, 
which the camera slowly and deliberately zooms into.  
  
 
 
Table 4: Multimodality in Hannah Goslar’s speech, 2005 
13.41 
 
“But before she became an 
international symbol of the 
Holocaust, she was my 
childhood friend 
13.48 
 
Our families lived next 
door in Amsterdam, after 
we fled from Germany 
[slow zoom 
into the 
image] 
14.01 
 
[…] we would go for 
walks, pushing my baby 
sister in a pram, and 
chatter about what we 
wanted to be when we are 
older” 
 
Table 5: Multimodality in Hannah Goslar’s speech, 2005 
15.24 
 
“During this terrible time, I 
occasionally thought of 
Anne” 
 
 
 
The power of this multi-modal testimony comes from the combination of the commonplace 
and the exceptional: a photo of smiling children, enjoying their time together in the sun; 
children playing together, imagining what they wanted to be when they got older; and the 
awful truth that Anne Frank, the smiling girl we see on screen, was murdered; she, and more 
than a million like her, never grew to be adult. These photographic documents are therefore 
not merely non-artistic rhetorical proofs of the claim that Hannah knew, and was close with, 
Anne; they function as icons (in the Peircean sense) of Jewish life in Europe before the war, 
as symbols of what was lost – and therefore also as symptomatic demonstrations of the 
inhumanity of Nazism. 
Hannah Goslar’s testimony is striking for another reason – there are only three jokes told 
during all four televised HMD commemorations (3.5 hours of television), and two of these 
are told by Hannah. The second of these, that when she was young she swapped a picture 
card of the-then Princess Elizabeth for a different member of European Royalty, raised a wry 
smile from HRH Queen Elizabeth II, sat in the attending audience:  
Figure 1: Smiles in the audience, 2005 
 
Her first joke is reproduced below: 
 
 
[14.09] Anne, of course, wanted to be a writer. My mother used to say about Anne: 
‘God knows everything. But Anne knows everything better’. 
[14.22 – smattering of laughter in audience] 
Telling a joke at a Holocaust commemoration, or ‘about’ a Holocaust victim, is quite an 
audacious thing to do.4 Even summarising it – for example ‘Hannah told a joke about Anne 
Frank’ – feels transgressive. The rhetorical success of this joke was due to two factors. First, 
her ethetic strategies: she reveals practical wisdom of that which she speaks (phronēsis), 
having suffered through and survived the Holocaust herself; and she demonstrates her virtue 
(aretē) and good will (eunoia) through the depth of affection she evidently still holds for 
Anne. Second, the joke works because of what it reveals about Anne’s character; evidently, 
she was, in colloquial terms, a bit of a ‘clever clogs’, whose belief that she ‘knows best’ was 
lampooned by Hannah’s Mother. The joke works because it helps rescue Anne from her 
iconic status as innocent “symbol of the Holocaust”; it restores some of her complexity, 
reminds us of other similarly self-assured children (and how impossible they are to reason 
with!), and reveals something rich and poignant about Anne’s interactions with friends and 
family.  
The Chief Rabbi has given a speech at every national HMD commemoration in Britain since 
its inception (both those televised and those not). In 2002 and 2005 these speeches were 
given by then-Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks; in 2015 and 2016, the current Chief Rabbi 
Ephraim Mirvis spoke. The structure and length of the speech delivered at the 2002 ceremony 
mean it is particularly suitable for analysis; it is reproduced in its entirety below: 
 [11.08] When humans beings do good, said the sages, they’re little lower than the 
angels. But when they do evil, they sink lower than the beasts. And in the Holocaust, 
humanity reached its deepest abyss. Whole communities who had lived with their 
neighbours for a thousand years, were murdered in days. A guard at Auschwitz, 
 
 
testifying at the Nuremberg trial, admitted that at the height of the genocide, when the 
camps were killing ten thousand Jews a day, children were thrown into the furnaces 
alive.  
[11.58 music starts to fade in] 
The Holocaust was a black hole in history. It was evil for evil’s sake.  
And as we think of those who didn’t escape. What would they want of us now? Those 
who managed to leave a final message, asked just one thing: that we remember. That 
we remember what happens when hate takes hold; when evil is done and no one 
protests; when we forget that that life is sacred, and strangers, too, are human. Create, 
they would have said, a better world, where doors are open to those in danger of their 
lives. Where we respect the dignity of difference, and where our shared humanity 
gives us the courage to fight, for those who cry for help. Let us teach these things, 
diligently, to our children. 
[speech ends 13.05; music ends 13.15] 
 
The speech adopts a two-part structure: the first half, a Judicial argument, looks back to the 
past and presents an argument regarding the inhumanity and injustice of the Holocaust. The 
argument scheme of this half of the speech is relatively straightforward: he presents two 
standpoints, each supported by symptomatic illustrations – one supported by compound 
illustrations, and the second supported by a single example. This can be presented 
schematically as in the figure below: 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Reconstruction of Sacks’ Forensic argument 
 
 
[Premises]  
 
[Presented 
as symptomatic of] 
[Standpoints] 
 
 
It is notable that, whilst the stress of this first half of the speech is on the genocide of 
Europe’s Jews, the identity and motivation of the killers are vague: they are simply “evil” 
murderers. And whilst Auschwitz and “the camps” are mentioned, nothing else is said about 
the circumstances of these murders, nor about the circa 3million murdered Jews who were 
not killed in camps. Some scholars – for example Bloxham (2002) – have criticised official 
HMD commemoration on the grounds that it tends to offer only broad accounts of both the 
motivations of perpetrators and the historic contexts that variously enabled and obstructed 
their actions. However, such criticism misunderstands the rhetorical conventions of 
commemorative discourse. Just as it would be inappropriate for a funeral orator to relay the 
precise manner of someone’s death in graphic detail, so too it could be undignified for 
Holocaust commemoration to “dwell on concrete descriptions of the specific actions taken 
by” perpetrators (Condit 1985: 294). Echoing precisely Condit’s (1985) analysis of the 
Boston Massacre Orations, here the Chief Rabbi doesn’t provide the audience with 
“newspaper-like reportorial accounts”, but instead “depicted events on a larger canvas” 
(p.294). He offered an “abstract, yet passionate” account of the Shoah – referring to the mass 
murder of children, in particular, and by the most callous means – as a way of placing the 
genocide “in the emotional and valuational contexts of the community” (p.296). In so doing, 
Whole communities who had 
lived with their neighbours 
for a thousand years, were 
murdered in days 
at the height of the 
genocide […] the 
camps were killing ten 
thousand Jews a day 
in the Holocaust, humanity 
reached its deepest abyss 
A guard at Auschwitz, testifying 
at the Nuremberg trial, 
admitted that […] children were 
thrown into the furnaces alive 
[The Holocaust] was 
evil for evil’s sake 
 
 
he emphasises the (im)moral dimensions of Holocaust – as “evil” – and the values of the 
norm circle, rather than broaching “the questions most important to historians of the 
Holocaust: Who carried out the attacks on Jews and other targets, on their property, their 
communities, their dignity, their lives?” (Bergen 2012: 160).  
In the second half of the speech, Sacks presents two deliberative arguments: that we should 
“remember”, and that we should create “a better world”. Each of these standpoints is 
supported by arguments from causation, presented as two lists of three (tricolon) – though 
Sacks also argues that we should remember the past because the victims of the Holocaust 
have apparently asked it of us (which is a version of an argumentum ad vericundium). It is 
notable that the musical accompaniment fades in as he starts to deliver this deliberative case – 
the swell of the music complimenting the emotional tenor of the speech and his hopes for “a 
better world” where “we respect the dignity of difference”.  In Table 6, below, I first provide 
a reconstruction of the argumentation and its unexpressed premises: 
 
Table 6: Reconstruction of Sacks’ deliberative arguments, 2002 
[Premises] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Standpoints] 
 
[victims asked us to remember]  
 
[acting in accordance with 
wishes of Holocaust victims is 
a way to honour them] 
 
[the past provides an example 
of how not to act in the face of 
hate and evil] 
 
[this knowledge will help us to 
face evil in the future] 
 
 
 
[Therefore] 
[We should] “remember” 
[we need to remember our shared 
humanity] 
 
[humanity, in all its difference, is of 
equal worth; we should respect 
difference] 
 
[we should help those in danger of their 
lives by opening our doors to them] 
 
[we should help those who cry out for 
help] 
 
[these would be achieved in/through 
creating a better world] 
 
[Therefore] 
[We should] “Create […] a better world” 
 
 
 
Sacks argues that politically advantageous social conditions will be brought about – caused – 
by remembering. Remembering and forgetting, presuppose both a remembering/forgetting 
subject and the existence of knowledge that this subject is remembering/forgetting. In one list 
of three, starting “That we remember…”, Sacks links processes of remembering/forgetting to 
moral action in a causal way – that is, we should remember past injustices to ensure an 
advantageous, worthy and just future. This tricolon simultaneously communicates: 
grammatical entailments that we know something (and must remember rather than forget); 
more specific presuppositions that are inferable from the immediate context of the speech 
situation (a HMD speech, given by the Chief Rabbi, inferring that this is knowledge related to 
the Holocaust); moral presuppositions about our values, structured as ‘if/then’ conditionals; 
and a consequent application of these to support an entailed moral action. Taking each clause 
in turn, we can reconstruct their argumentation as follows: 
 
“That we remember what happens when hate takes hold”  
[entailment] we have knowledge of what happens when hate takes hold;  
[context-invoked implication] the Holocaust is what happens when hate takes hold; 
[conditional] if we are to avoid another Holocaust then we need to ensure hate doesn’t 
take hold 
[corollary: deliberative case for moral action] we should ensure hate doesn’t take hold 
[That we remember what happens] “when evil is done and no one protests” 
[entailment] we have knowledge of what happens when evil is done and no one 
protests;  
[context-invoked implication] the Holocaust happens when evil is done and no one 
protests;  
 
 
[conditional] if we are to avoid another Holocaust then we need to protest when evil is 
done] 
[corollary: deliberative case for moral action] we should protest against evil 
[That we remember what happens] “when we forget that that life is sacred, and strangers, too, 
are human.”  
[entailments] we have knowledge that life is sacred; we have knowledge that the lives 
of strangers are also sacred;  
[context-invoked implications] we know what happens when we forget life is sacred 
(x); we know what happens when we forget the lives of strangers are also sacred (y); 
the Holocaust happens when (x) and (y);  
[conditional] if we are to avoid another Holocaust then we need to remember that life 
(including the lives of strangers) is sacred  
[implication] if life (including that of strangers) is sacred then it should be protected;  
[corollary: deliberative case for moral action] we should protect life, including the 
lives of strangers 
Taken together, these three deliberative cases for moral action – we should ensure hate 
doesn’t take hold; we should protest against evil; we should protect life – could be viewed as 
obvious. Indeed, in many ways the case for action is the corollary of the terms employed, 
given their overwhelmingly negative prosody – of course hate should be opposed (who would 
argue that hate needs to be nurtured?). Is advancing these standpoints, therefore, a pointless 
exercise? No, as Pernot (2015: 96) points out,  
the answer is subtler. Granted that listeners already know their duty, the oration serves 
the useful purpose of a reminder, especially at times when hearers might be tempted 
to forget. Even granting that listeners always act as they should, the orations still 
strengthen their resolve, encourage them to persevere, and urge them to go further. 
 
 
The seeming banality of the argumentation also belies its national context-specific nature. 
This meta-narrative account – that the Holocaust is an example of prejudice in extremis, and 
that we can guard against future atrocities by keeping the prejudice of others in check – are 
‘lessons’ which liberal multi-ethnic bystander countries take from the Holocaust; they are the 
‘lessons’ that pervade British and American commemoration, in particular, because to argue 
that the Holocaust took place because of the prejudice of others is in no way threatening to 
the national self-image. However, they are absent from the commemoration of perpetrator 
countries like Germany, which has historically tended towards a more functionalist 
explanation of the Holocaust. Similarly, they are absent from Israeli commemorative 
discourse, where historically the Holocaust has been viewed as the ultimate proof of both 
Europe’s indefatigable antisemitism and the corresponding need of a solution, in the form of 
Israel (Marrus 2015). 
I point this out not to suggest that I think one or other of these lessons is correct. But rather to 
note that the moral lessons taken from Holocaust relate to time and place. They tend to 
present themselves as universal – in the case of the Chief Rabbi’s speech, as our presupposed 
knowledge that we need to remember – however they are particular, and particular in ways 
that index the norm circle that produces, consumes and shares them. 
 
Conclusion 
This article explored the rhetoric, and mass-mediation, of the national Holocaust Memorial 
Day (HMD) commemoration ceremony, as broadcast on British television. I argued that these 
commemorative events represent a blended rhetorical genre that bring together the forensic 
and epideictic species of rhetorical argument, detailing the circumstances and injustices of the 
Holocaust in order to revivify our commitment to the values that it so clearly transgressed. 
However, given that Nazi guilt is taken to be axiomatic, the primary rhetorical goal of these 
 
 
commemorative ceremonies is epideictic rather than forensic. The purpose of epideictic 
rhetoric is not simply “to say the truth, but to re-affirm and recreate afresh the consensus 
around prevailing values” (Pernot 2015: 98) and, as such, epideictic speeches are one way in 
which a norm circle is discursively invoked, shaped and refreshed.  
The national ceremony commemorating Holocaust Memorial Day has been broadcast four 
times since the first HMD in 2001. These programmes function as a complex, multi-modal 
epideictic, recounting the injustice of genocide in order to revivify shared social values. They 
feature a combination of images, film clips, music, candle lighting and readings and speeches 
made by survivors and other public figures, each of which can be treated as a rhetorical text 
which contributes to the epideictic whole. As one of three species of rhetoric, epideictic relies 
on a combination of non-artistic and artistic means of persuasion. Just as such means of 
persuasion can be used reasonably, so too can both derail into fallacy by, for example, 
presenting an image that is not symptomatic of that which it claims, or by presenting an 
overly reductive narrative of the Holocaust as caused by prejudiced ideas.  
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1 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the Holocaust Remembrance (A/RES/60/7, 1 November 
2005), http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/res607.shtml [accessed 04 September 2017] 
2 See, for example, Böser’s (2012) and Prager’s (2014) analysis of Yael Hersonski's documentary "A Film 
Unfinished", examining reels of film shot by Nazis in the Warsaw ghetto. 
3 An official programme is produced for all national HMD ceremonies, detailing the running order and 
speakers. The speakers would therefore not be anonymous for those attending the ceremony in the Hall, only 
for those watching the television broadcast. 
4 The third and final joke in the corpus, also from the 2005 ceremony, was told by the writer and television 
presenter Stephen Fry; it failed to generate any laughter. 
